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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
NO. 03-1705
____________
KOMLA N. EWUAME
 Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
                                                                   Respondent           
____________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A78-432-500)
                         
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 26, 2004
BEFORE: NYGAARD, AMBRO and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed :  October 28, 2004)
                         
OPINION
                         
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge
Komla N. Ewuame (“Petitioner”) petitions for review of the decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which summarily affirmed the decision of the
     1We use the term, “INS,” to include the former Immigration and Naturalization1
Service as well as its successor agencies, the Department of Homeland Security, the2
Bureau of Border Security, and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.3
2
Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum based on the
finding that the application was made more than one year after Petitioner’s arrival in the
United States and was thus time-barred.  The IJ also denied Petitioner’s application for
withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),
finding that Petitioner failed to show that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured
or persecuted if he returns to Toga. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the Petition.
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Since we write only for the parties, we will set forth only the facts relevant to the
issues.  Petitioner is a native of Togo.  He legally entered the United States on August 8,
2000, as a temporary non-immigrant visitor with the authority to remain here until
October 8, 2000.  Petitioner did not leave the United States on or before that date and
remained here until the INS1 instituted removal procedures on February 28, 2002.  In
September, 2000, Petitioner applied for a student visa, but he never actually received
student status.  In his application, Petitioner stated multiple times that he wished to secure
an education “before I return to my country to hold a good position in the Togo
government.”  Petitioner also applied for asylum in March, 2002, after the INS instituted
removal proceedings.  In addition, when his case was brought before the IJ, Petitioner
requested withholding of removal and protection under the CAT.
3According to his testimony, Petitioner is a known activist against the Togolese
government and is in danger of being tortured or murdered if he returns to the country. 
Petitioner testified that he is a member of Union of the Forces of Change (“UFC”), a
political organization that opposes the current Togolese regime.  He testified that the
police often broke up UFC meetings using tear gas and that his UFC membership caused
his life and family to be threatened.  Petitioner was a government employee for 28 years
before leaving Togo, but he was transferred to a lower position in the government and
intimidated by co-workers because of his anti-government activities.  
Petitioner also testified that he was twice arrested and detained and that he was
tortured and severely beaten during each of those detentions.  The first arrest came when
Petitioner was accused of planning a coup after traveling to Benin to visit family, and he
was detained for one month.  One beating was so severe that, according to Petitioner, he
was hospitalized with a broken back.  The second arrest came because Petitioner was
receiving certain anti-government publications in the mail, and he was detained for one
week.  Petitioner was still a government employee and was not wanted by the Togolese
authorities when he left the country.
The IJ issued its decision on July 30, 2002, denying Petitioner asylum relief,
withholding of removal, and CAT protection.  The BIA took appellate jurisdiction over
the IJ decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), (9).  On February 13, 2003, the BIA
summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision.  This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for
4Review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s jurisdiction over final orders of removal is generally limited to review
of BIA decisions.  However, in cases such as this, where the BIA summarily affirms the
IJ decision without an opinion, this Court reviews the IJ decision.  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft,
338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002).
The scope of review is narrow.  This Court applies substantial evidence review to
findings of fact.  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001).  We are thus
bound by the administrative findings of fact unless a reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Abdille,
242 F.3d at 483.  In addition, this Court gives Chevron deference to the BIA’s reasonable
statutory interpretations.  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 2003); see
also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).  However, “deference is not due where findings and conclusions are based on
inferences or presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the record, viewed as a
whole.”  Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
III.  DISCUSSION
1. Petitioner’s Application for Asylum
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), an applicant for asylum must demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within one year of the
5date of his or her arrival in the United States.  However, the time limit may be excused if
the applicant demonstrates “either the existence of changed circumstances which
materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances
relating to the delay in filing an application....” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). 
Petitioner asserts three bases for excusing his late filing under this exception. 
First, Petitioner claims that he had legal status in the United States as a student until April
17, 2001, and that his asylum application was filed within one year of the end of his
student status.  The evidence suggests, however, that Petitioner only applied for a student
visa and never actually obtained student status.  Second, Petitioner asserts that he did not
know how to go about applying for asylum.  The IJ found this argument insufficient,
especially considering that Petitioner was sophisticated enough to avail himself of the
application process for a student visa.  Finally, Petitioner argues that the fact that he wrote
articles disparaging the Togolese government which were published on the Internet
constitutes “changed circumstances,” because those articles make it more dangerous for
him to return to Togo.  However, these articles were not published in Petitioner’s name,
and Petitioner did not explain how anyone would know that he wrote the articles.  The IJ
thus rejected Petitioner’s changed circumstances argument.
Even if Petitioner’s argument on this point had merit, we do not have jurisdiction
to review the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to demonstrate “changed
circumstances.”  This Circuit held in Tarrawally that we lack jurisdiction to review
6determinations by the BIA or IJ regarding what constitutes extraordinary circumstances
under § 1158(a)(2)(D).  338 F.3d at 185.  Petitioner argues, though, that this Circuit has
not expressly held that the IJ’s determination of what constitutes changed (as opposed to
extraordinary) circumstances is outside of our jurisdiction.  This argument is completely
without merit.  We held in Tarrawally that 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(3), which states, “No court
shall have jurisdiction to review any determination...under paragraph (2),” clearly
expressed congressional intent to preclude judicial review of extraordinary circumstances
findings.  Petitioner fails to recognize that paragraph (2) of § 1158(a) includes both
extraordinary circumstances and “changed” circumstances.  Consequently, although we
did not expressly say so in Tarrawally, § 1158 (a)(3) also divests us of jurisdiction to
review the IJ’s determination regarding Petitioner’s purported changed circumstances.
2. Eligibility for Withholding of Removal or Protection Under the CAT
The Petitioner has the burden of proof for establishing eligibility for withholding
of removal and for protection under the CAT.  Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 133
(3d Cir. 2003); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.  To establish eligibility for withholding of
removal, a petitioner must establish that his “life or freedom would be threatened in [his
home] country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(3)(A).  The Supreme
Court has held that a petitioner must establish that it is “more likely than not” that his life
or freedom will be threatened.  INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1987).
7To gain relief under the CAT, a petitioner must establish that “it is more likely
than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 
8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (c)(2).  In finding that Petitioner failed to meet his burdens with respect
to both forms of relief, the IJ pointed to numerous inaccuracies in Petitioner’s testimony
as well as Petitioner’s failure to provide corroborating evidence.  As we understand it, the
IJ reasoned that Petitioner’s failure to provide corroboration was fatal to his ability to
meet his burden of establishing eligibility for relief, especially given the inconsistencies
in Petitioner’s testimony.
Petitioner argues, however, that his testimony was not inconsistent or incredible in
any way.  Petitioner’s brief points out numerous findings by the IJ regarding alleged
inconsistencies in Mr. Ewuame’s testimony that were not supported by substantial
evidence.  This Court has stated that, although we afford deference to the IJ’s factual
determinations, we will not uphold an IJ’s conclusion that “is not based on a specific,
cogent reason, but instead, is based on speculation, conjecture, or an otherwise
unsupported opinion.”  Dia, 353 F.3d at 250; see also Gao, 299 F.3d at 272.  Moreover,
“minor inconsistencies” that do not go to the heart of the claim for relief do not constitute
sufficient evidence to support adverse credibility determinations.  Gao, at Id. (citations
omitted); see also Tarrawally, 338 F.3d at 187.
The instant case is similar to Tarrawally in that some of the IJ’s reasons for finding
Petitioner’s testimony to be inconsistent “were based on presumptions not grounded in
8the record....  However, the IJ also offered other rationales which went to the heart of the
withholding of removal and Convention claims, which could not be adequately
explained....”  338 F.3d at Id.  For instance, the IJ disbelieved Petitioner’s arrest story
because “the military and gendarmerie have very little concern for those whom it arrests
and holds,” yet the military showed “concern” for Petitioner by taking him to the hospital
for his injuries.  A.R. at 47.  As Petitioner’s brief points out, if we accept the fact that the
military took Petitioner to the hospital for a broken back, it supports the claim that the
military inflicted those injuries rather than the conclusion that the military was somehow
concerned for his well-being.  The IJ did not offer any explanation for choosing one
conclusion over the other.  Thus, the IJ’s conclusion on this point seems to be based on
sheer conjecture and unsubstantiated opinion.  In addition, the IJ found that Petitioner
“failed to answer any question directly” and that his answers “wandered.”  However, a
review of the transcript from Petitioner’s testimony reveals that this finding is completely
without basis in the record.  Petitioner responded to virtually every question directly and
only occasionally had to be asked a question more than once.
At the same time, however, the IJ’s findings on other inconsistencies are supported
by substantial evidence and severely undercut Petitioner’s ability to meet his burdens. 
For instance, the IJ found out that Petitioner did not offer a cogent explanation for why
such a well-known political activist would be able to continue to hold a “good position in
the Togo government” for 28 years.  More significantly, Petitioner failed to reconcile his
     2Cf. Tarrawally, 338 F.3d at 186 (upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility determination1
in part because the petitioner “did not introduce any evidence other than his testimony to2
9
alleged fear of torture and persecution in Togo with the multiple statements in his
application for a student visa evidencing an intent and desire to return to Togo and to his
position in government.  These are the sorts of inconsistencies that go to the heart of
Petitioner’s claims for withholding of removal and CAT protection.
Given these inconsistencies, we cannot fault the IJ’s insistence on certain
corroborating evidence.  This Circuit recognized in Abdulai v. Ashcroft that the BIA or IJ
may, under certain circumstances, require corroboration from an otherwise credible
witness in order to meet his burden of proof.  239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001).  We  also
approved the BIA’s three-part inquiry for determining when it is proper to require
corroboration.  Id.  According to this standard, the IJ must make “(1) an identification of
the facts for which ‘it is reasonable to expect corroboration;’ (2) an inquiry as to whether
the applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and, if he or she
has not, (3) an analysis of whether the applicant has adequately explained his or her
failure to do so.”  Id. (quoting In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. 722, 725 (BIA 1997)).
In this case, Petitioner failed to provide any corroborating evidence.  Moreover,
the IJ identified two facts for which it was reasonable to expect corroboration.  First was
Petitioner’s assertion that he is a member of the political opposition group, the UFC.  This
assertion is central to Petitioner’s claim for relief, and the IJ found that corroborating
evidence – Petitioner’s UFC membership card – was reasonably available to Petitioner.2 
show that he belonged to groups opposing the [government] and was persecuted on3
account of his political opinion”).4
     3Petitioner asserts that he has not been in telephone contact with his wife since before1
he was detained by the INS in February of 2002.  He also asserts that requesting her to2
send the membership card by mail would be futile because the Togolese government is3
interfering with the mail.  However, Petitioner offered no evidence to support his claim4
that the government was intercepting his mail, and he offered no testimony that he has5
ever attempted to have his wife mail the membership card.6
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The IJ also found that Petitioner’s purported explanation for not producing the evidence –
that he gave the card to his wife before leaving Togo – was insufficient given that
Petitioner remained in contact with his wife after arriving in the United States.3
Second, the IJ determined that it was reasonable to expect corroborating evidence
of Petitioner’s back injury that allegedly occurred during his first arrest.  Petitioner stated
that he received an X-ray confirming the injury at the hospital in Togo, but he does not
now have the X-ray or any other medical documentation.  Moreover, the IJ found that a
broken back is such a serious injury that Petitioner could have received confirmation of
the injury from a doctor even after arriving in the United States.
Since Petitioner failed to give a cogent explanation to reconcile his long-standing
“good position in the Togo government” and his apparent desire to return to Togo with
his history of political activism and his fear of torture and persecution, we agree that it
was reasonable for the IJ to require corroborating evidence from Petitioner to meet his
burden of proof.  We therefore uphold the decision of the IJ that, without providing such
evidence or adequately explaining his failure to do so, Petitioner has failed to meet his
11
burden of proving eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection.
For the foregoing reasons we deny the Petition.
